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ABSTRACT: Stein called Finite and Eternal Being her ‘spiritual 
legacy’. The access to this legacy has been restricted by the dif-
ficulty of assessing exactly what it is that Stein is doing in the 
work. It has been regarded as a work of Thomist philosophy, 
but a closer reading reveals it as quite critical of St Thomas. 
After the publication of the appendices of the work, it has be-
come fairly clear that it can be conceived as a critique of the 
early Heidegger. Stein understood her task as being that of 
bringing together Aristotelian and Modern philosophy, the lat-
ter represented by Phenomenology and the former by Scholas-
ticism. We shall propose (the beginnings of ) an interpretation 
of the work that sees it as the culmination of Stein’s phenome-
nological project, as well as a work standing in the tradition of 
the philosophia perennis.
Introduction
Beginning to read Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being is some-
what daunting, as one seems to remain at the level of beginning 
for quite some time. To assist that beginning, I shall here give an 
overview of the preoccupations that structure the work. As I still 
consider myself a beginner, I must avert to the fact that some 
accents might be misplaced and some essential issues uninten-
tionally left unaddressed.1
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We shall first characterise the general tenor of Stein’s thought 
as an engagement with the value of the individuality of the hu-
man person (1). This engagement is the centre of a philosophy 
that can be characterised equally as Christian Philosophy (2), 
Phenomenology and Formal Ontology (3) in the expression it 
finds in Finite and Eternal Being. We shall then attempt to ex-
plain how Finite and Eternal Being pertains to each of these dis-
ciplines and how the disciplines are related in the work (4).
From Stein’s early work in Phenomenology (1915-20) 
through Introduction to Philosophy (1916-31) and The Structure 
of the Human Person/What is the Human Being? (1932-33), to 
culmination in Finite and Eternal Being (1935-36) and Science of 
the Cross (1942), an unfolding or maturing is to be observed, 
which sets the scene for understanding Finite and Eternal Being 
as a final or concluding statement.2 We shall endeavour to ex-
plain how Finite and Eternal Being, by being characterisable in 
all of the manners proposed, achieves a unity aimed at by Stein 
from her earliest writings.3 
1. The Tendencies Implicit in Stein’s Work as a Whole
Stein shows from her earliest writings, and in contrast to 
Husserl, exceptional awareness of how various types of sociality 
influence thought, i.e. how they provide the setting for the expe-
riencing I.4 Thinking, for Stein, and as a consequence philoso-
phy, is not a context-independent exercise: it not only reflects 
the social setting in which it occurs, it also depends on it. The 
choice of context that a philosopher makes is therefore one that 
will not only be reflected in her or his philosophy, but also one 
that will substantially contribute to the philosophy itself. This is 
something the thinker can count on, and indeed must reckon 
with: the context is the setting of the text she or he produces. 
Stein’s choice of the context of the Catholic Church for her mid-
dle and later thought must be seen in this light, and we must 
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expect that she chose that context because she considered her 
thinking best served by it, since she had a profound commit-
ment to philosophical truth. The best context is, according to 
Stein’s account, the one that allows for the deepest possible in-
sight, but, given that a context is real and really maintained in a 
real community of real people with many different agendas, the 
same context may also constrain, just like any work environ-
ment is both enabling and constraining. Stein’s engagement 
with the nature of Christian Philosophy prolongs her desire to 
think with, and in, context, and her reflections on the topic in 
the introduction to Finite and Eternal Being remains one of the 
most balanced and interesting accounts in the context of the 
‘Modernist Crisis’.5 
As thought has its context provided by the community that 
sustains it, it likewise contributes to such a context. Hence Stein 
is aware of creating a climate for the reader, and offers herself as 
someone who thinks the perspective of the reader is as impor-
tant as that of the author. Stein is a ‘with-thinker’ by profound 
conviction, and as a consequence she is always relying on the 
reader to test what she says by personal insight; implying by this, 
both that it is possible to think ‘with’ another, and that the world 
is open to be tested by the experience of different people.6 Nei-
ther could be taken for granted in the philosophical environ-
ment she came from; both are distinct contributions of Stein’s to 
that context, which, although practically accepted in her contri-
butions to the publications of both Husserl and Heidegger, un-
fortunately has been theoretically neglected and overlooked. 
That Stein believes in ‘with-thinking’ as a phenomenologist 
allows her to compare thinkers in a manner that is both simple 
and highly reflective: because she presupposes that every thinker 
is attempting to express reality as he or she sees it, i.e. actually 
expresses a perspective on reality, every kind of thought (wheth-
er sincere or not) testifies to reality as it is in itself. Understand-
ing the perspective hence allows one to understand reality better, 
Beginning to read Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being 141
and perspectives may be compared to establish the partiality of 
each of these.7 This kind of comparison is the key to understand-
ing her attempt to bring together the thought-streams of Phe-
nomenology and Scholasticism: in so far as they both are per-
spectives on reality, understanding the manner in which they 
relate to each other allows one to better grasp what each attempts 
to grasp and establish the relationship between the things thus 
grasped. What remains the focus of such a comparison, however, 
are the things themselves, upon which the perspective sheds 
light, and indeed of which the perspectives form part. The re-
course to the perspectives of others is therefore constantly subor-
dinated to the revelatory capacity of the perspectives as regards 
‘die Sachen selbst’. According to this view the things are there-
fore ipso facto taken to admit of different perspectives on them, 
and thus to be something intelligible in themselves, i.e. indepen-
dently of individual perspectives, although not necessarily inde-
pendent of any possible perspective. The engagement with the 
things themselves goes hand in hand with an understanding of 
the workings of intersubjectivity.
It is the importance of community (as a type of intersubjec-
tivity) for thought that makes Stein thematize that which binds 
us together and makes our experience convertible and sharable: 
the fact that we are human beings. This is why the question of 
the human person remains central to her thought right through 
her life. The question is important because it stands at the root 
of the openness to and of the world: it is the question that ad-
dresses the ‘hub’ around which the intersubjective world revolves 
and which as a consequence provides us with the best starting 
point for our interpretation of it.8 
The intersubjective dimension of the world makes her philoso-
phy feel more ‘realist’ than the transcendental idealism of the later 
Husserl and his disciples, but it remains a fact that she thought she 
learnt the understanding of this dimension from her teacher, the 
early Husserl. The underlining of the intersubjective dimension 
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allows Stein keen awareness of the possibilities for social con-
struction to either hamper or foster the development of the hu-
man being and person. This leads her to reflect on the State, the 
association-community of most decisive importance in Modern 
times, where the human being is both central and exposed, and 
on the State’s essentially problematic relationship with religion, 
which claims a privileged relationship with those values upon 
which the State relies.9 Stein’s phenomenology is thus one that 
allows for and incorporates social analysis to an extent that Hus-
serl’s (apparently) does not: it therefore feels not only more real-
ist, but also more aware of the political possibilities for dog-
matic strategies, than his does.
Apart from the centrality of the human person and the un-
derlining of the intersubjective context which will lead her to 
reflect on the nature of Christian philosophy as we shall see, the 
pursuits of Phenomenology and Formal Ontology were in fact 
inherited from her teacher Husserl. Stein understands these in a 
slightly different manner compared to him however, dictated by 
the foundation of her thought on specifically intersubjective 
constitutional phenomenology. It is this foundation that allows 
her to discuss Aristotelianism and Scholasticism as perspectives 
on ‘the things themselves’ without leaving the methodological 
starting point of phenomenology.10 It is this foundation that al-
lows her to study the meaning of being, i.e. the depth and kinds 
of intelligibility present in what appears to be as such, in what it 
is and that it is.
Finite and Eternal Being is undoubtedly close to Scholastic 
Philosophy, both in the manner in which its discussions are con-
ducted, and in the subjects discussed. We may indeed be able to 
call it a work of Scholastic Philosophy, if we by that understand 
the type of philosophy which asks for the ultimate reasons and 
the meaning of being in the tradition of the philosophia perennis. 
It is Stein’s achievement that Finite and Eternal Being neverthe-
less also is a work that not only owes its method and form to 
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Phenomenology, but is a work of Phenomenology, i.e. of spe-
cifically intersubjective constitutional Phenomenology. The 
main achievement of the work, in fact, is the funnelling of clas-
sical and modern ways of thinking into one stream of thought; 
the insistence on the fact that they must concern the same things 
and hence provide compatible perspectives on them. 
It is also, however, this wide contextuality (relying on what 
Gadamer calls a ‘fusion of horizons’) of the work that makes it 
difficult to access for those bound by loyalty to either classical or 
modern ways of thinking, and who regard these as incompatible. 
It is difficult for those loyal to classical and medieval philosophy 
because the vocabulary, the starting point, the methodology and 
the things not taken for granted are unfamiliar. It is difficult for 
those loyal to a modern context because Christian teachings are 
deliberately drawn upon as indispensable for accomplishing the 
ascent to the meaning of being, which is the work’s stated intent. 
It may also present an obstacle to those loyal to a modern context 
that Stein discusses concepts from the metaphysics of Aristotle 
and Aquinas in great detail (although in fact very critically), in 
order to clarify her own understanding of the meaning of being.
Such widening of contextuality or merging of horizons is 
possible to the extent that Phenomenology ultimately is a quest 
for the meaning of being that acknowledges the subjective start-
ing point of Modern philosophy. Stein thought that it was that, 
and thought that the purpose of the methodological bracketing 
of prejudicial and dogmatic ontological affirmations was pre-
cisely to enable the quest to succeed. The use of Phenomenology 
to indefinitely postpone the fulfilling of the quest can only, in 
her estimation, be explained by ulterior motives, and cannot in 
any way be understood to form part of the essence of Phenom-
enology without rendering it an irrational endeavour.
Having characterised the general tenor of Stein’s work, let us 
now look at the proposed three characterisations of the content 
of Finite and Eternal Being in detail and examine them in turn, 
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reading the work as a concluding statement of the tendencies 
inherent in Stein’s thought.
2. Christian Philosophy
The Introduction to Finite and Eternal Being contains, as 
said, a section on the ‘Meaning and Possibility of a “Christian 
Philosophy”’ (§ 4). Here Stein justifies the taking account of 
Christian doctrine in the doing of philosophy, and claims that so 
doing is what the believer will want to do, in so far as he recog-
nises the insight of faith to be divinely inspired and reflecting 
realities, which, although obscure to the mind reaching out in 
‘the dark night of faith’, nevertheless are understood to be higher 
and deeper than those accessible by the sole light of natural un-
derstanding. Stein claims it would in fact be unreasonable for 
the believer, i.e. for anyone accepting that the revelation of God is 
available to us, not to take such revelation into account, given that 
what is implied in this belief is that God’s superior wisdom has 
made itself accessible to us, like one human being reveals some-
thing of his inner life to another by opening himself up to him. 
Such Christian Philosophy, relying on the testimony of others as 
regards the Other who is God, is relying on the testimony of the 
‘Christian community’ for its context (like philosophy of Physics 
relies on the testimony of the community of scientists to provide 
its context). It also contributes to this context, like philosophy of 
science contributes to the scientific context by thematizing it. In 
this sense Christian philosophy exemplifies a context-sensitive 
kind of philosophy, which, like other contexts, remains essentially 
open for anyone to test by his own lights, taking as hypotheses 
what the Christian (or the scientist) accepts as theses.
One might not, however, be able to call this Christian phi-
losophy which takes account of Revelation ‘pure’ philosophy, in 
so far as one understands pure philosophy to be a purely ‘natu-
ral’ science, i.e. a science relying on natural insight alone, in 
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contradistinction from ‘supernatural’ insight. It is necessary to 
recall however, that the idea of a distinction between ‘natural’ 
and ‘supernatural’ insight in the first place is of religious origin, 
and intends to describe the difference between what we can 
‘come up with’ independently of Revelation, and what Revela-
tion by itself contributes. The distinction should in other words 
make mere hypothetical sense to someone who does not believe 
there is such a thing as Revelation, and as such it would form 
part of the (Christian) context. It is ‘the Thomistic standpoint’ 
however, (and here Stein refers specifically to Maritain) that 
pure philosophy does not involve taking account of Revela-
tion.11 To the Thomist, therefore, Stein’s Christian philosophy 
would not be ‘pure’. In so far however, as the task of philosophy 
is to penetrate to ‘the ultimate meaning, to being itself, to the 
constitution of beings as such’ (p. 27) then one cannot afford to 
disregard the light Revelation sheds on these matters, as it in-
deed does shed significant light on them. Stein reminds us that 
the Church Fathers understood Christianity as (their) philoso-
phy precisely because they regarded it to substantially further 
this central aim of philosophy. To them the purity of philosophy 
depends on its relationship with truth.
In the same way as Maritain distinguishes between the ‘na-
ture’ and ‘state’ of philosophy, and thinks that the Christian 
state of philosophy allows it a better grasp of the final end of the 
human being and therefore of moral philosophy, so Stein thinks 
that the Christian state of philosophy – not only relying on the 
grace pertaining to individuals, or on the philosophical advances 
resulting from the clarification of theological matters, but di-
rectly on the state of affairs ‘known’ by the light of faith (Crea-
tion, the Fall, Redemption and the End) – allows it to grasp the 
meaning of being better than if it renounced the guidance of the 
light of faith.12 Still more radically put: if philosophy is the sci-
ence of ultimate reality, whose goal is final clarity and the final 
understanding of the states of affairs that obtains,13 it cannot 
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dispense with the light of faith in so far as faith also claims to 
know something about these ultimate states of affairs. For the 
non-believer, Stein claims, it must be quite intelligible that the 
believer thinks in this way, and indeed that it is part of the way 
his faith has importance for him. The non-believer should thus 
be able to replace the theses which the believer accepts by faith 
with hypotheses that could be accepted, if one believed. In this 
way the perspective of the Christian philosopher is open to the 
non-believer as context-dependent, in the same way as any other 
context-dependent perspective is: The explanatory power of phi-
losophy in this context may indeed convince some that faith is a 
reasonable option.
This science of ultimate realities, philosophy as the ‘perfec-
tum opus rationis’, is essentially incomplete, because it is of ul-
timate realities and because the human mind is finite also in its 
ability to take other perspectives into account. Its essential in-
completeness makes it open to further developments in other 
sciences, including that of theology. Stein saw the essential 
openness of philosophy already in Philosophy of Psychology and 
the Humanities: the depth of reality as comprehended by the 
very many subjects, past, present and future, with whom the I 
can stand in relation and understand, reflect the depth of the 
wisdom that must be God’s, infinite, all-present and all-embrac-
ing. The Structure of the Human Person, Stein’s philosophical an-
thropology, had its counterpart in the collection of dogmatic 
declarations assembled in What is the Human Being?14 Stein 
rightly expects the reader to be impressed by the understanding 
of the human being available from these sources, which in fact 
has shaped European thought substantially. 
It is in the light of the essential openness of ‘the perfect work 
of reason’ that Stein’s introductory statement must be taken: Fi-
nite and Eternal Being is written for learners by a learner: it could 
be nothing else if it were to be true to its own ideal of philosophy. 
Christian philosophy remains open, not only to all perspectives 
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on reality, but also to the power of the Holy Spirit revealing the 
divine perspective in many ways and by many means. 
By acknowledging its context-dependence, debt to Revela-
tion and consequent essential openness, Christian Philosophy 
may contribute to the openness of any context into which it is 
taken up. As such it is achieved in community by individuals 
attracted to or affected by the light of Christ. Finite and Eternal 
Being is Christian Philosophy in this sense: compared to Marit-
ain’s Thomism, it is both more open to a diversity of perspec-
tives, and more substantially Christian in that it allows for Re-
demption to have an effect even on the perception of material 
reality, for example. According to Stein, in guise of illustration, 
matter presents an obstacle to intelligibility to the fallen mind, 
but not to the redeemed mind: to the latter, matter is infinitely 
intelligible and can be brought to conform to human design 
because of this intelligibility.15
3. Phenomenology and Formal Ontology
Finite and Eternal Being is not only Christian Philosophy. It 
is also Phenomenology, and indeed represents a concluding 
stage of Stein’s engagement with this discipline. This, however, 
means that it is inseparable, in her view, from Formal Ontology, 
in a manner we shall attempt to say something general about 
here. A complete investigation of this issue will have to await 
another occasion.
As already said, Stein’s phenomenology is constitutively in-
tersubjective. This means that she is interested in understanding 
the different ways in which social formations influence the 
worldview of those who constitute them and constitute them-
selves as part of them. The second part of her first habilitation 
thesis (Individual and Community) concerns this topic. She did 
however, already in her Introduction to Philosophy, perhaps writ-
ten in part simultaneously with Individual and Community,16 
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consider the insight into the intersubjective constitution of the 
world as synthesisable in a manner that allows us to talk about 
what things are—i.e. what they appear to be, all things and per-
spectives considered, in a kind of conjecture which we are bound 
to make when we speak and deal with each other because of the 
proto-Wittgensteinian insight that intelligible meaning cannot 
be private or reserved for one perspective alone. We generally use 
our insight into intersubjective constitution (which may also be 
faulty) when we talk about how things ‘really are’, despite what 
‘people might think’. Awareness of intersubjective constitution 
constitutes a reflective refinement of the ‘natural attitude’, so 
that the ‘final’ judgement as to what things are accomplishes the 
methodology of phenomenology by exhausting it in the sense 
that it penetrates, by means of the many perspectives, to the es-
sence of things. 
Concern with essence was also part of Husserl’s understand-
ing of phenomenology, and here indeed in the form of a com-
plementary type of analysis that was required for constitutional 
analysis to work.17 Eidetic analysis: the investigation of the es-
sences in terms of which we make sense of our experience, is a 
type of analysis that does not pronounce judgement about 
whether phenomena in fact reflect this or that reality, but rather 
turn attention to the structure of what is experienced and to 
what must pertain to this experienced something for an experi-
ence to be of it (e.g. what must pertain to a moth for my experi-
ence of it to be an experience of a moth, or what must pertain to 
perception, for my experience to be perception). The judgement 
of existence is a solemn affirmation that something is publicly 
accessible, i.e. that it is available to many perspectives or is inter-
subjectively constituted, whether as this or that or simply. This is 
how ‘being’ is publicly available, i.e. it is what it means when we 
say something is. It is possible that Stein was more amenable 
than Husserl to draw this latter conclusion from the implica-
tions of eidetics: she did not regard it as possible for the thinker 
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(and therefore for the philosopher) to stay away from judging 
about existence for any longer than it is possible for the diver to 
hold his breath.18 
Few has characterised the difference between Husserl’s and 
Stein’s understanding of the relationship between constitutional 
(transcendental) phenomenology and formal ontology (eidetics) 
as well as Hans Rainer Sepp, in his forward to the forerunner of 
Finite and Eternal Being: Potency and Act.19 As in fact this work 
displays the same tendencies as Finite and Eternal Being, and as 
these tendencies are very accurately detected by Sepp, we shall 
quote him at length:
Stein requires, like Husserl, a ‘starting-point’.. [but] for Stein 
the fact of the activity of the subject is not an occasion to sus-
pend the question of the being of this immanent act[. It is 
rather so that] this act itself, its actuality, discloses in its tempo-
rality, i.e. in its continual passing from potentiality to actuality, 
ex negativo the ‘idea of pure being’, which escapes temporality 
[..] If Husserl takes the starting-point to clear the absolute im-
manent sphere of transcendental subjectivity, so Stein takes the 
constituting function of subjectivity as an occasion to show 
that subjectivity needs and refers to something that it is itself 
not. That [subjectivity] is constituting – and that means ‘tem-
poralising’ time and ‘decaying’ subjectivity – refers it to some-
thing non-temporal; that it constantly constitutes something 
refers it to something that does not coincide with its own im-
manent being. Thus Stein is brought to affirm a sphere of pure 
being (a transcendent sphere in a second sense) which must be 
distinguished from both the immanent sphere and the sphere 
of transcendence announced in the former as distinct. The dis-
cipline which attempts to circumscribe the meaning of being in 
all [of these] spheres is that of Formal Ontology.
Thus is revealed that Formal Ontology is not, for Stein, as it is 
for Husserl, subordinated to transcendental phenomenology, but 
stands in a reciprocal relationship with it. Formal Ontology is for 
Stein referred to transcendental phenomenology, in so far as this 
latter is not only treating of the relationship between the imma-
nent and the transcendent spheres, but also must question the 
constitution of the entities of Formal Ontology. Transcendental 
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Philosophy is referred in the opposite direction to Formal On-
tology, not only because it is the task of the latter to determine 
the meaning of immanence in conjunction with the material 
ontologies, but because it falls to it to clarify in a general way 
the fundamental ontological concepts.20
The reciprocal relationship between Formal Ontology and 
Constitutional Phenomenology (between the analysis of essence 
and the analysis of how things are constituted for us within con-
sciousness) is one Stein probably took to be constitutive to phe-
nomenology, so that she would regard it as impossible to subordi-
nate one discipline under another in the way Sepp here claims 
Husserl did. Whether or not Husserl did that, and where it would 
leave his philosophy if he did, is not of our concern here. What is 
of our concern, however, is to underline that Stein did not con-
sider it possible to separate the two disciplines, or subordinate one 
to the other, and still have the discipline of phenomenology in-
tact. For the phenomenological reduction to experience to yield a 
field of meaning to be investigated by transcendental phenome-
nology, there must in the field of meaning be meaning that can be 
investigated. The analysis of this meaning calls for a related disci-
pline that clarifies the meanings possible, investigates how they 
relate to one another and perhaps condition one another. We 
know from the fact of intersubjective constitution in the manner 
Stein portrays it that this meaning is there: things must be intel-
ligible and analysable as such (and that means they must have es-
sence) for them to be possible objects of intersubjective constitu-
tion, i.e. for them to be identifiable by several subjects. 
Stein’s use of the phenomenological starting-point, i.e. of the 
possibility to reduce experience to how it is experienced or to 
subjective experience (mediated by intersubjective experience), 
is thus methodological, and its purpose is to penetrate to final 
clarity about the ultimate things, the things themselves. The 
starting-point forms the platform for showing that the subject 
has experience of something which transcends the temporal ex-
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istence it recognises as its own – the suspension over the swords-
edge of the now. This is the units of experience, which it experi-
ences as lasting in time, and indeed as revelatory of realities, like 
‘joy as such’, the being of which is not temporal at all. Essences, 
as experienced by the subject understanding its experience as 
intelligible because of them, are not essentially temporal as the 
experience of the subject is; they don’t rely on time for their be-
ing. The simple analysis of experience has thus already given us 
the being of the I, which is temporal and the being of the es-
sences, which is not, and hence it has handed us two types of 
being, such that the meaning of being must encompass and al-
low for this differentiation, and for others we would fall upon, 
when reflecting on experience. The lifting of the epoche is in fact 
not necessary, in so far as we are looking for the meaning of be-
ing: a Seinslehre, such as it is Stein’s ambition to construct, does 
in fact not have to make any judgements about existence: it only 
has to show what it means to make them.
Conclusion
This meaning of being is investigated equally and simultane-
ously by the three disciplines that essentially characterise Finite 
and Eternal Being: Christian Philosophy, Phenomenology and 
Formal Ontology. That Stein managed to achieve the ambition 
of articulating a ‘teaching on being’ from these sources, an ambi-
tion to which her engagement with philosophy pointed from 
her earliest career, must have given her quiet, but profound, sat-
isfaction. She, of course, would rejoice still more in the fact that 
it is possible, that truth is common, that the science of philoso-
phy isn’t eternally divided but is one and universally accessible. 
That, it seems to me, is what she tries to make accessible to us in 
Finite and Eternal Being and probably what makes her call it her 
spiritual testament. At least: thinking or knowing this might 
provide us with a starting point for beginning to read the work.
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Endnotes
1. Two books, which have just come to my attention, are bound to 
further the understanding of the work. Although I have not had the 
time to read them in full, I cite them here for the benefit of the reader: 
Peter Freienstein, Sinn verstehen. Die Philosophie Edith Steins, Interna-
tionale Maurice Blondel-Forschungsstelle für Religionsphilosophie, 
London: Turnshare, 2007 and Peter Volek, Erkenntnisstheorie bei Edith 
Stein, Frankfurt etc.: Peter Lang, 1998.
2. Chronology according to Marianne Sawicki displayed on the 
Husserl Page www.husserlpage.com/hus_r2st.html [accessed 27/8-
2009], and as regards Introduction to Philosophy completed by the stud-
ies made by Mariele Wulf and published as the introduction to the 
work in Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe (ESGA), vol. 8: Einführung in die 
Philosophie.
3. Freienstein’s idea of Stein conceiving reality on the scheme of 
dialogue is very appealing. We shall have to differ from Freienstein, 
however, in his understanding that Stein does not follow Husserl’s 
transcendental reduction but instead takes her point of departure from 
the empirical I (op. cit. p. 54). Stein, in our understanding remains 
completely loyal to the phenomenological method, inclusive of its re-
duction to transcendental phenomenology, but – and here is how we 
do perhaps not differ at all – the point of view of the other is always 
already accessible to me by means of empathy, without which I could 
not make sense of experience as I know it. It is experience, anyway, 
with its pole constituted as the pure I, that is the final court for Stein. 
It makes no sense to talk about a transcendental (or pure) I before ex-
perience. It is also this very experience that makes it indispensable to 
talk about constitution as the function through which the differentia-
tion of experience is articulated. 
4. See in particular Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(transl. by Catharine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki, The Collected 
Works of Edith Stein (CWES VII), Washington DC: ICS Publications, 
2000) and An Investigation Concerning the State (transl. by Marianne 
Sawicki, (CWES X), Washington DC: ICS Publications, 2006). Both 
of these were originally published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch (subsequently 
published together as Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der psy-
chologie und der Geisteswissenschaften – Eine Untersuchung über den 
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Staat, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1970. Only the latter has come out in 
Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe vol. 7. The former is planned as vol. 6). 
Stein’s work for Husserl as editor of Ideas II should also be mentioned. 
See Marianne Sawicki, Body Text and Science. The literacy of investigati-
ve practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1997, pp. 153 ff. and also ‘Making up Husserl’s Mind about Constitu-
tion’, in: Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, ed. by Will Des-
mond, 2007, pp. 191-216. Will we eventually see some of that work 
included in the ESGA?
5. Endliches und ewiges Sein (ESGA 11-12), Freiburg: Herder, pp. 
20-36. The English translation of the work (Finite and Eternal Being, 
tr. Kurt Reinhart (CWES IX), Washington DC: ICS Publications, 
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